Abstract. We discuss a model of a two-person, non-cooperative stochastic game, inspired by the discrete version of the red-and-black gambling problem presented by Dubins and Savage. Assume that two players hold certain amounts of money. At each stage of the game they simultaneously bid some part of their current fortune and the probability of winning or loosing depends on their bids. In many models of the red-and-black game it is assumed that the win probability is a function of the quotient of the bid of the first player and the sum of both bids. In the literature some additional properties, like concavity or super-multiplicativity are assumed in order to ensure that bold and timid strategy is the Nash equilibrium. Our aim is to provide a generalization in which the probability of winning is a two-variable function which depends on both bids. We introduce two new functional inequalities whose solutions lead to win probability functions for which a Nash equilibrium is realized by the bold-timid strategy. Since both inequalities have not easy intuitive meanings, we discuss them in a separate section of the paper and we give there some illustrating examples.
Introduction
The red-and-black gaming problem goes back to L.E. Dubins and L.J. Savage [3] . P. Secchi [10] dealt with a two-person red-and-black game in which the first player wants to maximize the probability of winning a certain amount of money, while the second player wants to keep his opponent from this. L. Pontiggia [8, 9] proposed a modification in which the players' win probabilities can possibly change at each stage of the game. Later, M.-R. Chen and S.-R. Hsiau [1, 2] , Y.-C. Yao and M.-R. Chen [11] provided further modifications and generalizations. The purpose of the paper is to present a yet another generalization of the model, in which the win probability is a two-variable function which depends on the two bids. The problem can be described shortly as follows. Two players start the game with some initial fortunes, say x 0 and y 0 being positive integers. The first player wants to reach a goal, which is an integer M 1 greater than x 0 and not greater than x 0 + y 0 , and the second player also wants to reach his goal M 2 , which is an integer between y 0 and x 0 + y 0 . Later on we will assume that M 1 = M 2 = x 0 + y 0 . The two players bet at each stage of the game an amount which is a nonnegative integer not greater than their current fortunes. If a current fortune of the first player is x and he stakes an amount a, a current fortune of the second player is y and he stakes an amount b, then their next fortunes will be x + b and y − b, respectively with probability P , or x − a and y + a, respectively with probability 1 − P . We will assume that the probability P depends upon a and b. The game lasts until one of the players reaches his goal. For technical reasons we admit the possibility that a = 0 or b = 0. In this case P is equal to 0 and 1, respectively, and therefore in case of such bets nothing happens with the player' fortunes (i.e. a bet of zero units gives a sure victory for the opponent, regardless his choice). We also assume that at every stage of the game each player choose his action without any knowledge of the action chosen by the opponent. Thus the game we consider is non-cooperative.
Assume that the bet of player I is equal to a and the bet of player II to b. Then the fair probability P for the first player to win would be a/(a + b). In [8, 9] a class of probabilities under which the game is sub-or superfair is given. The authors of [1, 2] assumed that the probability of winning is a function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] which depends upon the value a/(a + b). It turned out that convexity and supermultiplicativity of function f imply that the bold-timid strategy is a Nash equilibrium for the game. In the present paper we will develop this research further and instead of function f (a/(a + b)) of one variable, we will work with a two-place win probability function P (a, b).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we formally define the model of the game. First, we check when the game is subfair. Then, we prove that if a certain inequality is satisfied, then an optimal strategy for first player is to play boldly when the second player plays timidly. Next, we provide conditions under which it is best for the second player to bet timidly when the first player plays boldly. In Section 3 we solve two functional inequalities which are introduced in Section 2. Last section of the paper is devoted to some examples and final comments.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that R denotes the set of real numbers, Z is the set of integers, N stands for the set of positive integers and N 0 = N ∪ {0}. 
The game
Assume that we are given an integer M ≥ 2 which represents the total amount of money in the system. The initial fortune of player I is equal to x 0 ∈ N and of player II to y 0 ∈ N. We assume for simplicity that x 0 + y 0 = M and the goal for both players is to to win the amount of M . Therefore the state space for both players is the set S = {0, 1, . . . , M } and the game terminates when one of the player reaches 0 or M . The possible actions of a player are {0, . . . , t}. A strategy is called timid, if at each stage of the game the player bets just one unit of his current wealth. A strategy is called bold, if the player always bets his entire fortune. Now, let us describe the law of motions in our model. We need a function which assigns the probability of victory as a function of bets of the players. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies the border conditions:
The value P (0, 0) can be undefined. As some places we will make a natural assumption that P is nondecreasing with respect to the first variable and nonincreasing with respect to the second one. This means that the chances for winning the turn are better if the player bets (and thus risks) more. Let X n denote a random variable which is equal to the fortune of player I at a time n ∈ N and suppose he bets an amount a n ∈ {0, . . . , X n }. Simultaneously, let the fortune of player II at the same time be denoted by Y n and assume that he bets b n ∈ {0, . . . , Y n }. In our model the laws of motions for the players are defined by formulas
X n+1 = X n + b n , with probability P (a n , b n ), X n − a n , with probability 1 − P (a n , b n ), (3)
for n ∈ N.
We assume that the sets of possible actions of both players contain zero. However, as a rule of the game, they are not allowed to bet zero units whenever their fortunes are positive. Then condition (1) means that a hypothetical bet of zero units by any player has no effect on the game (in a sense that the fortunes of both players don't change during this stage). In particular, from this it follows that X n+1 = X n and Y n+1 = Y n whenever X n ∈ {0, M }. Therefore, we can think of (X n ) and (Y n ) as of infinite sequences.
A special case of this model, when
was studied by M.-R. Chen and S.-R. Hsiau in [1] . This in turn is a generalization of L. Pontiggia models [8, 9] . Our subsequent results can be therefore viewed as an extension of this research. Our approach is motivated by these fine articles. The game is called subfair if the process X n is a supermartingale. Similarly, the game is superfair if the process X n is a submartingale. We begin with an easy condition upon P which implies that the game is sub-or superfair regardless the strategies of both players. This result is a slight modification of the first part of [8, Theorem 3.1], see also [1, p. 907] .
is an arbitrary mapping and we consider a discrete two-person red-and-black game with the law of motions described by formulas (2), (3) and (4). Then the game is subfair if and only if
The reverse inequality holds true if and only if the game is superfair.
Proof. Fix n ∈ N. We have
= X n + (a n + b n ) P (a n , b n ) − a n a n + b n .
Thus, if bids of both players at the n-th stage of the game are equal to a n and b n , respectively, then the sequence (X n ) of random variables is a sub-or supermartingale iff the value in the last square bracket is positive, or negative, respectively.
Next, we are going to prove a counterpart to [1, Theorem 2.1] by M.-R. Chen and S.-R. Hsiau. They showed that a convexity of f given by (5) is a sufficient condition for the fact that the bold strategy is best for player I if player II plays timidly and the game is subfair. We propose another functional inequality to obtain an analogous effect. However, we do not generalize [1, Theorem 2.1], but instead we provide a new class of win probability functions. We will work with a one-variable map ϕ : S → [0, 1] defined as (6) ϕ(x) = P (x, 1), x ∈ S.
Before we proceed with the theorem, we will recall some crucial notions. We refer the reader to the monograph of A.P. Maitra and W.D. Sudderth [7] for a comprehensive treatment of the topic. We say that a function Q : S → R ∪ {−∞, +∞} is excessive for some game γ at a point x ∈ S if either E[Q] is undefined or it is defined and E[Q] ≤ Q(x). A strategy σ is a sequence σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . such that σ 0 is a gamble and for n = 1, 2, . . . σ n is a function which maps a partial history (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of the game a gamble σ n (x 1 , . . . , x n ). If a strategy σ of a player is given, then Q is excessive for σ at x ∈ S if it is excessive at σ 0 and for every partial history (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of positive probability of occurrence Q is excessive for the gamble σ n (x 1 , . . . , x n ) at the point x n .
The following theorem provides a criterion for optimality of a strategy in terms of excessivity of some mapping.
Theorem 1 (A.P. Maitra and W.D. Sudderth [7] , Theorem 3.3.10). A strategy σ is optimal if and only if the function Q : S → R ∪ {−∞, +∞} given by
is excessive, where u is the utility function.
For our purposes, we will restrict ourselves to the case when u is equal to the identity mapping.
Theorem 2. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies (1) and the map ϕ : S → [0, 1] given by (6) is a nondecreasing solution of the inequality
for x, y ∈ S such that y ≤ x. We consider a discrete two-person red-and-black game with the law of motions described by formulas (2), (3) and (4). Assume that player II plays a timid strategy. Then the bold strategy is best for player I.
Proof. First, we will verify inductively that
for every x ∈ {0, . . . , M } and a ∈ {0, . . . , x}. If a = 0, then clearly
since ϕ(0) = 0. Now, assume that (8) holds true for some a ∈ S and all x ∈ {a, . . . , M }. We will prove it for a + 1. If ϕ(a) = 1, then ϕ(a + 1) = 1 and we are done. Thus, we assume that ϕ(a) < 1. Take some x ∈ {a + 1, . . . , M }; we have
Therefore, it is enough to show that
Since ϕ ≤ 1 and ϕ is nondecreasing, then we are done if we prove
This in turn follows directly from inequality (7) applied for y = x − (a + 1).
Since player II plays timidly, then the law of motions of player I who plays boldly takes the form: X 1 = x 0 ∈ S, X n+1 = X n + 1, with probability ϕ(X n ), 0, with probability 1 − ϕ(X n ),
Denote by Q(x) the probability of victory for player I who has an initial fortune x, i.e.
Q(x) = P{X m = M for some m ∈ N}. It is clear that Q(0) = 0, Q(M ) = 1 and
Easily one obtains an inductive extension of the above formula:
In view of Theorem 1, in order to finish the proof it is enough to prove that function Q is excessive. This means that we need to verify inequality
for all x ∈ {1, . . . , M −1} and a ∈ {0, . . . , x}. But this is ensured by (8) and (9) .
Our next statement is a counterpart to [1, Theorem 2.2] by M.-R. Chen and S.-R. Hsiau and is in a sense dual to Theorem 2. A new inequality for the two-place win probability function is introduced in order to derive the excessivity condition.
Theorem 3. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies (1) and
for every x ∈ {0, . . . , M } and a ∈ {0, . . . , M − x} and b ∈ {0, . . . , M − a}. We consider a discrete two-person red-and-black game with the law of motions described by formulas (2), (3) and (4). Assume that player I plays the bold strategy. Then the timid strategy is best for player II.
Proof. Assume that at n-th stage of the game player II bets an amount of b. If player I plays boldly, then his law of motions of is the form X n+1 = X n + b, with probability P (X n , b), 0, with probability 1 − P (X n , b), whenever 0 < X n < M . Denote by T (x) the probability of victory for player II who has an initial fortune M − x. Clearly T (x) = 1 − Q(x), where Q is defined in the proof of Theorem 2. In view of Theorem 1 the proof will be completed when we prove that T is excessive. In other words, we need to justify inequality
for all x ∈ {0, . . . , M − 1} and b ∈ {0, . . . , M − x}. Directly from the definition we get T (0) = 1. Therefore, an equivalent formulation of (11) with the use of function Q is simply
From inequality (10) we get P (x, 1)P (x + 1, 1) ≤ P (x, 2).
Using this and (10) once again one can prove inductively that
Now, using the formula (9) for a = b − 1 and with x replaced by x − (b − 1), jointly with the last inequality we derive
and the proof is completed.
Joining both theorems we obtain a corollary which shows the existence of a bold-timid Nash equilibrium. Corollary 1. Assume that P : S × S → [0, 1] is a mapping which satisfies (1) and (10) for every x ∈ {0, . . . , M } and a ∈ {0, . . . , M − x} and b ∈ {0, . . . , M − a}. Further, assume that the map ϕ : S → [0, 1] given by (6) is a nondecreasing solution of (7) for x, y ∈ S such that y ≤ x. Then the bold-timid strategies is a Nash equilibrium of the discrete two-person red-and-black game with the law of motions described by formulas (2), (3) and (4).
Functional inequalities
In this section we will construct possibly large classes of functions solving inequalities (7) and (10), which play crucial roles in our model. Next section contains examples and a discussion of some particular cases. We begin with inequality (10). First, we will observe an easy but useful extension property. Proof. Fix a, b, x ∈ Z arbitrarily. Observe that if at least one of numbers x, a, x+a, b is nonpositive, then the left-hand side of (10) is equal to zero and (10) is satisfied, since P attains nonnegative values. If a + b < 0, then either a < 0 or b < 0 and similarly the left-hand side of (10) vanishes. If x + a > M , then (10) reduces to a trivial identity. In other cases (10) is satisfied by P since P solves this inequality.
Note that it can happen that P (x, y) = P (x, y) for some (x, y) ∈ {0, . . . , M } × {0, . . . , M }, but this is possible only in case x + y > M , which never happens in the game.
In view of Proposition 2 we can study solutions of (10) defined on Z × Z, or more generally, on the square of an Abelian group. Proposition 3. Assume that (G, +) is an Abelian group and P : G × G → R is a mapping which satisfies inequality (10) for every x, a, b ∈ G. Then a map
is a solution to the multiplicative Sincov's inequality:
Proof. Replace a by a − x in (10) to get
, a, b, x ∈ G. Now, replace in this inequality b by b − a to prove (13).
In [5] we solve inequality (13) on topological spaces. We are going to utilize our results in a special case of Z × Z equipped with the discrete topology. Let us quote [5, Corollary 3] . Assume that X is a nonempty set. Denote ∆ = {(x, x) : x ∈ X}. Next, for a fixed mapping F : X × X → (0, +∞) introduce a class of functions:
The general solution of (13) is given in the following statement.
Corollary 2 ([5], Corollary 3).
Assume that X is a topological separable space and F : X × X → (0, +∞) is a solution of (13) which is continuous and equal to 1 at every point of ∆. Then
Conversely, for an arbitrary family F of positive functions on X every mapping F : X × X → (0, +∞) defined by (14) solves (13), it is equal to 1 on ∆ and F ⊆ F (F ).
Moreover, from (1) we get F = 1 on ∆ and F (0, b) = 0 for b ∈ Z. Therefore, if F is positive on N × N, then from Corollary 2 we obtain a representation of P :
Therefore we have established the following description of solutions of inequality (10) for mappings defined on N 0 .
is a solution of (10) which satisfies (1) and P (a, b) > 0 whenever a > 0. Then
Conversely, for an arbitrary family P of functions on N 0 which vanish only at 0 every mapping P : N 0 × N 0 → [0, +∞) defined by (15) and with P (0, 0) being arbitrary solves (10), satisfies (1) and P (a, b) > 0 whenever a > 0.
Corollary 3 provides a method of construction of solutions of (10) starting with an arbitrary family of functions. In order to force the function P given by formula (15) to be a win probability function it is enough to assume that 1 ∈ P. Some examples are provided in the next section.
Now, we will turn to inequality (7) . We will provide a description of solutions in case of differentiable functions defined on an interval. We will need the following fact.
Proposition 4 ([4, Proposition 1])
. Let I be a non-void open interval, let f : I → R be a differentiable function and m ∈ R an arbitrary constant. Then
if and only if there exists a nonincreasing and differentiable map d :
For technical reasons we will assume that functions are defined on a half-open interval containing zero as its left endpoint and we work with a one-sided derivative at zero. 
Proof. We begin with the first part. Fix t ∈ (0, M ) and apply (7) for y = x − t to get
Tending with t → 0 and using the differentiability of ϕ we arrive at
To finish this part of the proof it is enough to apply Proposition 4 with f replaced by −f (we have m = −c and i = −d).
A straightforward calculation shows that for a given map i : [0, M ) → R function ϕ : [0, M ) → R given by (16) with arbitrary c ∈ R is a solution to (7) if and only if
which is true by (17) after substitution t = x − y.
Examples and final remarks
First, we will show how a known example of win probability can be obtained as a special case of our model with the aid of Corollary 3.
Example 1. Assume that we are given some number p ≥ 1. Define P as a family consisting of exactly one function f :
This win probability was introduced by M.-R. Chen and S.-R. Hsiau [1, Example 2.2 and Example 2.4]. Note that (7) and (10) are satisfied.
An curious example is provided by a family P consisting of a linear map and an exponential.
and f i (0) = 0. Therefore, for a, b ∈ N 0 we have
Next, observe that
for a, b ∈ N such that a > 1/m. Thus P (a, b) = exp (−mb), in particular in this case the probability does not depend upon a. If player I plays boldly and his initial fortune is large enough to meet the condition x 0 > 1/m and player 2 plays timidly, then the probability of winning a stage of the game for the first player is equal to exp (−m), which can be close to zero if m is big. Moreover, it is clear that is not best for player 1 to play boldly if his fortune exceeds the number ⌈1/m⌉, since he can bet precisely ⌈1/m⌉ to obtain the same possible gain as playing boldly, but with a smaller risk. This however does not contradict Theorem 2, since in this case ϕ given by (6) is a constant map equal to exp(−m) and this is not a solution of (7) .
With the aid of Theorem 4 one can construct a family of functions which solve (7) . To obtain a win probability function one needs to find a nondecreasing function i which satisfies (17) and such that ϕ given by (16) For a discussion of inequality (19) the reader is referred to the monograph E. Hille and R.S. Phillips [6] (inequality (7.4.1) therein). Below we will examine the simplest case with k = 1. (7) and is represented by formula (20) with k(x) = 1. Thus, all conditions of Theorem 2 are met. Note that P (x, x + 1) = 0 for all x ∈ S; in other words player II wins for sure if he bets more than his opponent. This does not contradict Theorem 2, since we assume that player II plays timidly. Therefore, in case when the initial fortunes of the two players satisfy x 0 < y 0 , the bold-timid strategy is not a Nash equilibrium, since player II playing boldly wins for sure, regardless the strategy of his opponent.
